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ABSTRACT
This article deals with the criminalization of violating religious feelings is of a scientific and 
research nature. The scientific problem is to determine the actual ratio legis of the act described in 
Article 196 of the Polish Criminal Code, which will ultimately allow to assess whether the criminali-
zation decision is right. The author does not share the commonly held views on the protection and 
justification of the criminality of offending religious feelings. A comparison of crimes that provide 
for punishment for violating other feelings, as well as violating feelings of a different nature with 
impunity, allows for the formulation of the thesis that in the case of Article 196 of the Criminal Code it 
was not religious feelings and their protection that became the reason for the criminalization decision. 
This reason is the fear of the social consequences of violating religious feelings. Since this behavior 
is criminalized in most countries around the world, the significance of these scientific findings is of 
international significance both theoretically and practically.
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The blasphemer, like a demon, attacks God himself.
He is worse than those who crucified Jesus Christ,
because they did not know him to be God;
but he who blasphemes, knows him to be God,
and insults him face to face.
Bernardine of Sienna1
INTRODUCTION
On the surface it may appear that the issue of offences against religious feelings 
is of marginal significance – the number of offences identified in official police 
statistics under Article 196 of the Polish Criminal Code is indeed really small.2 
However, the gravity of the problem means that it should be given due attention, 
and the review of media information confirms that it arouses intense emotions. 
And at the same time, as L.W. Levy points out, blasphemy is a taboo subject in all 
places where we meet with religion and its followers.3 Blasphemy is punished in 
virtually every legal system, regardless of the religion professed by the citizens of 
the country4. In other words, blasphemy is considered a criminal act in legal cultures 
shaped, among others, by Judaism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism.
This article addresses the issue of criminalization of the offence against religious 
feelings. The author’s intention is to step away from the classic approach to this 
issue and to establish what effectively determines the decision on criminalization 
and whether it is correct. Hence the necessity to keep clear of the well-trodden 
paths of analysis. Therefore, the following topics are discussed in the study: 1) the 
1 As cited in K. Kratiuk, Czas zacząć karać za obrazę Boga, 2017, http://docplayer.pl/61687903-
Czas-zaczac-karac-za-obraze-boga.html [access: 8.04.2020].
2 In 2016, 46 crimes were reported, 2015 – 32, 2014 – 38, 2013 – 54, 2012 – 51, 2011 – 33, 
2010 – 52. Notably, 2000 was a record year in the statistics covering the last several years since 145 
such crimes were reported. See Postępowania wszczęte i przestępstwa stwierdzone z art. 196 k.k. za 
lata 1999–2020, http://statystyka.policja.pl/st/kodeks-karny/przestepstwa-przeciwko-5/63492,Obra-
za-uczuc-religijnych-art-196.html [access: 9.04.2020].
3 L.W. Levy, Treason Against God: A History of the Offence of Blasphemy, New York 1981, p. 6, 
ac cited in D. Wąsik, Bluźnierstwo w wybranych kulturach prawnych, “Studia Iuridica Toruniensia” 
2014, vol. 15, p. 211.
4 On details of penalties imposed for blasphemy in selected European countries see A. Wąsek, 
Przestępstwa przeciwko przekonaniom religijnym de lege lata i de lege ferenda, “Państwo i Prawo” 
1995, no. 7, pp. 33–34; idem, Ochrona uczuć religijnych w prawie karnym, [in:] Prawo wyznaniowe, 
eds. H. Misztal, P. Stanisz, Lublin 2003, p. 216; W. Janyga, Przestępstwo obrazy uczuć religijnych 
w polskim prawie karnym w świetle współczesnego pojmowania wolności sumienia i wyznani, War-
szawa 2010, pp. 114–118.
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concept of feelings and religious feelings; 2) the essence of the crime of insult to 
religious feelings; 3) distinction between the concepts of insult to religious feelings 
and blasphemy and related formulations; 4) proposed amendments to the criminal 
law regarding the insult to religious feelings; 5) justification of criminalization and 
the subject matter of protection; 6) attempt at an answer to the issue indicated in the 
title – what is the ratio legis of the provision of Article 196 of the Criminal Code.
RELIGIOUS FEELINGS
It is extremely difficult to define the concept of religious feelings. In psychology, 
feelings are defined as intensified emotions processed by man and culture.5 In its 
judgement of 2004, the Supreme Court held that religious feelings are “a mental 
state whose essence lies in an internal response to past, present and future events 
directly or indirectly related to religion as a form of social awareness, including 
beliefs about the sense and purpose of human existence, humanity and the world”.6 
In the opinion of S. Hypś, religious feelings may be defined as a certain (primarily 
emotional) attitude of a given group to their faith, manifesting itself also in the 
right to protection of the respect for its professed values and revered places and 
objects.7 In turn, W. Janyga claims that religious feelings are to be understood as 
human relations with the sacred expressed on several levels – intentional, volitional 
and emotional.8 W. Wróbel is of the opinion that religious feelings are an emotional 
response of the individual accompanied by shame, embarrassment and sadness.9 
The Constitutional Tribunal recognized that religious feelings are a multi-faceted 
emotional attitude towards a professed religion.10 Finally, in the opinion of G. Jędre-
jek and T. Szymański, “religious feelings are […] personal interests within the 
meaning of Article 23 of the Civil Code, and therefore any insult or threat to such 
interests gives rise to an opportunity to make use of the legal instruments envisaged 
in Article 24 of the Civil Code”.11
5 M.J. Lubelski, J.M. Stanik, L. Tyszkiewicz, Wybrane zagadnienia psychologii dla prawników, 
Warszawa 1986, p. 82.
6 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 6 April 2004, I CK 484/03, OSNC 2005, no. 4, item 69.
7 S. Hypś, [in:] Kodeks karny. Komentarz, eds. A. Grześkowiak, K. Wiak, Warszawa 2015, p. 976.
8 W. Janyga, [in:] Kodeks karny. Część szczególna. Komentarz, eds. M. Królikowski, R. Za-
włocki, Warszawa 2013, p. 592.
9 W. Wróbel, [in:] Kodeks karny. Część szczególna, ed. A. Zoll, vol. 2, Warszawa 2013, p. 659.
10 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 6 October 2015, SK 54/13, Journal of Laws 2015, 
item 1632.
11 G. Jędrejek, T. Szymański, Prawna ochrona uczuć religijnych w Polsce (Próba oceny dotych-
czasowych rozwiązań, czyli o rozdźwięku pomiędzy literą prawa a jego aplikacją), “Studia z Prawa 
Wyznaniowego” 2002, vol. 5, p. 171.





Religious feelings are not mentioned directly in the Polish Constitution. They 
are inferred from the contents of Article 53 (1) of the Polish Constitution which 
provides that “Freedom of conscience and religion shall be ensured to everyone”. 
Pursuant to the judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 7 June 1994,12 religious 
feelings, due to their nature, are subject to special protection of law. The Consti-
tutional Tribunal found that they are directly related to the freedom of conscience 
and religion which is a constitutional value. The Constitutional Tribunal further 
held that freedom of conscience and religion is also expressed in the prohibition on 
offending religious feelings. Note should also be taken of the opinion of J. Sobczak 
stating that the protection of religious feelings is also a value provided for in Arti-
cle 25 (1) to (3) of the Polish Constitution. The same author sees that the relation 
between religious feelings and freedom of conscience and religion is borne out 
by international law, e.g. by the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, proclaimed by the 
UN General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 21 November 1981.13
It is a common opinion that religious feelings are relevant for religious believ-
ers. In contrast, A. Draguła expresses a largely isolated view that non-believers 
with a negative relation to the sacred also have religious feelings. The author calls 
such feelings negative or indifferent.14 As rightly pointed out by S. Dziwisz, the 
structure of the provision of Article 196 of the Criminal Code does not allow the 
conclusion that the protection under that provision extends also to religious feel-
ings given that they cannot be injured by means of profaning an object of religious 
worship or a place dedicated to the public celebration of religious rites.15 Further, 
the Constitutional Tribunal took the view that Article 196 of the Criminal Code 
does not protect the feelings of non-believers, since its provisions merely mention 
religious feelings.16
Z. Mikołejko raised the issue whether any feelings from the public sphere, 
including religious feelings, should be protected by law at all.17 At the outset, it 
may be interesting to list other feelings whose impairment is criminalized under 
Polish criminal law or constitutes the prerequisite for criminalization. These clear-
ly include: sense of security (in the event of punishable threat), feeling of shame 
(offence of pornography), self-esteem (offences of defamation and insult). It must 
be recalled that out of the feelings of attachment to third parties or attachment to 
12 K 17/93, OTK 1994, no. 1, item 11.
13 J. Sobczak, Obraza uczuć religijnych a wolność sztuki i ekspresji artystycznej, “Themis Polska 
Nova” 2015, no. 1, p. 87, 101.
14 A. Draguła, Bluźnierstwo. Między grzechem a przestępstwem, Warszawa 2013, p. 199.
15 S. Dziwisz, Ochrona uczuć religijnych w polskim prawie karnym, Lublin 2019, p. 128.
16 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 6 October 2015, SK 54/13, Journal of Laws 2015, 
item 1632.
17 Z. Mikołejko, Młot na Dodę i wolność słowa, “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 28.01.2012.
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an idea, criminal law protects respect for the dead as well as attachment to Poland 
(patriotism). The question could thus be raised what motivated the Polish legisla-
ture to include religious feelings in the list of criminally protected feelings, while 
at the same time disregarding other undoubtedly important feelings. It would also 
be interesting to establish why the legislator considered that the insult to religious 
feelings should lead to criminal liability and whether that was due to the influence of 
religion and the church on law-making, or whether there are other indications for it.
THE OFFENCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS FEELINGS IN THE CURRENT 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The subject matter of this study does not allow for a very detailed analysis of 
the statutory elements of the offence against religious feelings (reference can be 
made in this respect to the large body of literature).18 Only the key issues directly 
related to the assessment of the legitimacy of criminalization of the behavior under 
consideration and the scope of that criminalization are intended to be presented here.
Pursuant to Article 196 of the Criminal Code, whoever offends religious feelings 
of other persons by profaning in public an object of religious worship or a place ded-
icated to the public celebration of religious rites shall be subject to a fine, a penalty of 
limitation of liberty, or a penalty of deprivation of liberty for a term of up to 2 years.
Notwithstanding the importance of the statutory elements of the specific act 
(as well as the determination whether the offence under analysis is of a formal or 
material nature, and leaving aside the relationship between profanation and insult), 
the interpretation of the term “object of religious worship” appears to be the key 
issue given the subject of this study. Once the scope of the term is precisely deter-
mined, an ultimate clarification of the essence of the crime under Article 196 of the 
Criminal Code is possible. In a similar vein, only a brief overview of the opinions 
in this regard reported in the Polish literature is provided here.
The very wording of the term “object of religious worship” raises doubts. First 
of all, it is necessary to establish whether it concerns objects of religious worship 
or objects used in religious worship. The main difference lies essentially in whether 
the said object must be material, or whether it may be understood as meaning “in-
tangible beings”. The resolution of this matter will significantly alter the scope of 
the criminalized behavior.
18 See W. Janyga, Przestępstwo obrazy uczuć religijnych…; A. Draguła, op. cit.; R. Paprzycki, 
Prawna ochrona wolności sumienia i wyznania, Warszawa 2015; P. Kotas, P. Lewandowska, Ochro-
na uczuć religijnych a wolność wypowiedzi, Warszawa 2017; S. Dziwisz, op. cit.; M. Budyn-Kulik, 
Znieważenie uczuć religijnych – analiza dogmatyczna i praktyka ścigania, “Prawo w Działaniu. 
Sprawy Karne” 2014, no. 19.





A. Wąsek is of the opinion that “an object of religious worship” referred to in 
the said provision cannot be understood as God, the Mother of God, or any dogmas 
of faith.19 In his interpretation of the provision under analysis, J. Wojciechowski 
concludes that it contains a legal loophole – behavior consisting in offending God 
goes beyond the scope of criminalization even though it carries more weight.20 The 
literature review shows that clergymen may not be the object of religious worship, 
although such situations may indeed occur arousing doubts in that respect.21 Further, 
as stated by L. Gardocki, the term “object of religious worship” encompasses also 
“a cult object in a broader sense (e.g., insulting Muhammad, Buddha or Christ)”.22 
J.A. Prochowski identifies within a cult, i.a., its object who is a personal God.23 
W. Wróbel draws up a list of designations of an object of religious worship that 
comprises God understood personally or otherwise and such things, symbols, 
images, specific words or names as according to the doctrine of a given religious 
community are considered sacred, worthy of the highest respect, veneration and 
worship, in particular those that express God’s presence directly or are His sign. 
According to this author, rituals or words that are sacramental in nature may also 
be objects of religious worship.24 By contrast, some scholars associate the insult to 
religious feelings with a “ruthless attack on the Pope”. In a similar vein, G. Jędrejek 
and T. Szymański commented as follows: “It should also be recalled that the Polish 
Television broadcast statements that may be considered insulting to, among others, 
Cardinal Józef Glemp, Primate of Poland. And one cannot but note that in our 
mostly Catholic society the primate performs a crucial historically-rooted function 
of a spiritual leader who is particularly responsible for the fate of the nation”. An-
other example of the offence against religious feelings indicated by those authors 
included gross jokes poking fun at the Catholic Radio Maryja.25
Another serious interpretative problem concerns the above-mentioned term “re-
ligious feelings”, regardless of the dispute as to the significance of these elements of 
the statutory definition of the act for the existence of the crime. As given above, the 
Supreme Court noted in relation to this term that it is “a mental state whose essence 
19 A. Wąsek, Przestępstwa przeciwko przekonaniom religijnym…, p. 33. Similarly M. Filar, [in:] 
Kodeks karny. Komentarz, ed. O. Górniok, Warszawa 2004, p. 591; W. Janyga, Przestępstwo obrazy 
uczuć religijnych…, pp. 214–220.
20 J. Wojciechowski, Kodeks karny. Komentarz. Orzecznictwo, Warszawa 2002, p. 340.
21 M. Brzeska, O bezzasadności postulatu dekryminalizacji obrazy uczuć religijnych oraz po-
stulatu kryminalizacji publicznej obrazy przekonań światopoglądowych, “Jurysta” 2015, no. 4, p. 12.
22 L. Gardocki, Prawo karne, Warszawa 2001, p. 243. Similarly J. Wojciechowska, Przestępstwa 
przeciwko wolności sumienia i wyznania, [in:] Kodeks karny – część szczególna, ed. A. Wąsek, vol. 1, 
Warszawa 2004, p. 86; R. Paprzycki, Prawna ochrona…, pp. 116–118.
23 J.A. Prochowski, Wolność religijna jako jedno z podstawowych praw człowieka, [in:] Efek-
tywność europejskiego systemu ochrony praw człowieka, ed. J. Jaskiernia, Toruń 2012, p. 43.
24 W. Wróbel, op. cit., p. 501.
25 G. Jędrejek, T. Szymański, op. cit., pp. 174–177.
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lies in an internal response to past, present and future events directly or indirectly 
related to religion as a form of social awareness, including beliefs about the sense 
and purpose of human existence, humanity and the world”.26 Even the rules of the 
Criminal Code of 1969 state that feelings express the state of the subject, changes in 
the internal state of the individual and his/her relation to the surroundings. The extent 
to which particular individuals gain awareness of an emotional experience may there-
fore vary depending on the extent to which they are aware of the relation which they 
experience emotionally.27 A further issue concerns the criteria for the assessment of 
the offence against religious feelings. The question arises as to their nature – whether 
they are subjective or objective. A. Wąsek proposes that “the average sensibility in 
that area” should be considered adequate for the purposes of such assessment.28 This 
view is supported by R. Paprzycki who draws attention to the fact that sensibilities 
vary widely among individuals depending on their religious involvement. This author 
also notes that the religious feelings of persons deeply involved in religion may be hurt 
even when any truth of their faith is undermined or by a manifestation of atheism.29 
As regards the matter of D. Nieznalska, J. Warylewski criticizes the view that the 
average sensibility should be taken into account in assessing whether some artistic 
activity offends religious feelings. In his opinion, “reliance on assessments made by 
educated persons and those interested in art is in fact more appropriate than making 
reference to the prevailing social assessments”.30
It appears that the criterion of “average sensibility” for the assessment of injury 
to religious feelings fails both as regards the area of artistic or scientific activities 
and in situations of everyday life. As noted by L. Gardocki, persons deeply in-
volved in religion may perceive any attempt to call into question the truths of the 
faith they profess as offensive to their religious feelings. The author further points 
out that only such behavior should be considered a crime under Article 196 of the 
Criminal Code that is insulting in nature, i.e. the charge against the perpetrator must 
relate to the form of a statement or behavior.31 By way of illustration, the question 
arises whether writing about god, paraments and other religious artefacts using 
lowercase letters offends religious feelings through its insulting form.32 Another 
26 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 6 April 2004, I CK 484/03, OSNC 2005, no. 4, item 69.
27 J. Bafia, [in:] J. Bafia, K. Mioduski, M. Siewierski, Kodeks karny. Komentarz, Warszawa 
1971, p. 444.
28 A. Wąsek, Przestępstwa przeciwko przekonaniom religijnym…, p. 39.
29 R. Paprzycki, Prawna ochrona…, p. 112.
30 J. Warylewski, Pasja czy obraza uczuć? Spór wokół art. 196 Kodeksu karnego, [in:] W krę-
gu teorii i praktyki prawa karnego. Księga poświęcona pamięci Profesora Andrzeja Wąska, eds. 
L. Leszczyński, E. Skrętowicz, Z. Hołda, Lublin 2005, p. 8.
31 L. Gardocki, Prawo…, p. 270.
32 Bóg czy bóg, http://sjp.pwn.pl/poradnia/haslo/bog-czy-Bog;8654.html [access: 8.04.2020]. Cf. 
Zasady pisowni słownictwa religijnego, www.kul.pl/zasady-pisowni-slownictwa-religijnego,art_3460.
html [access: 8.04.2020].





question is whether wearing jewelry in the shape of religious symbols (especially 
in “non-obvious places”, such as the belly) solely for aesthetic purposes offends 
religious feelings by insulting, say, the cross. The problem of an inverted cross 
which led a radical Christian faction to accuse John Paul II of blasphemy may 
be proof of the mounting dilemmas and delicate nature of the matter.33 One may 
well wonder whether a figure of Christ crucified on a sickle and hammer offends 
religious feelings and thus satisfies the statutory elements of the provision under 
analysis. The assessment of that act may be affected by the fact that such a sculp-
ture was offered to Pope Francis by Bolivian President Evo Morales.34 Another 
example could be Christ nailed to a bomber that is falling down. In the opinion of 
Pope Francis, such exhibit does not offend religious feelings, as “it was a criticism 
of Christianity allied with imperialism, represented by the bomber”.35
Referring to the matter indicated above, two fundamental issues should be 
raised. First of all, it is clear that the act refers to the object of religious worship. 
The ban on broad interpretation in criminal law should remove any doubts in this 
respect. It should be added that the meaning of these words will be complemented 
by the teaching of a given religion. If a given denomination does not foresee the 
cult of objects for worship, then such meaning of the statutory wording is inad-
missible. Similarly, the principles of faith of a given religion or belief will provide 
an answer to the question whether the concept of “the object of religious worship” 
is an empty concept at the level of that denomination. This remark alone shows 
that this provision is definitely misused as a suggested criterion for a criminal law 
assessment of offending feelings. It must be recalled that the law criminalizes only 
such offence against religious feelings that involves profaning an object of religious 
worship or a place dedicated to the public celebration of religious rites.
With reference to the indicated examples, it seems appropriate to refer to the 
issue rarely examined in academic writings, i.e. the subject of the offence under 
Article 196 of the Criminal Code. It is commonly pointed out that it is a general 
crime – anyone can perpetrate that act. The main question that arises is whether 
indeed everyone can offend religious feelings. There is a need to evaluate whether 
a bishop, cardinal or pope can offend a Catholic believer’s religious feelings and 
thus commit a crime, or wonder whether words uttered by religious leaders in 
reference to their own religion can be by nature blasphemous. A case in point is 
33 10 symboli religinjnych. Co oznaczają i skąd się wzięły?, http://niewiarygodne.pl/gi-
d,14414844,img,14414943,kat,1017185,page,11,title,10-symboli-religijnych-Co-oznaczaja-i-skad
-sie-wziely,galeriazdjecie.html [access: 8.04.2020].
34 K.M. Kaproń, Chrystus, sierp i młot, 9.07.2015, www.tygodnikpowszechny.pl/chrystus-sier-
p-i-mlot-29119 [access: 8.04.2020].
35 Sierp, młot i Chrystus? „Gdy się zastanowić, to nie obraża”, 17.07.2015, www.fronda.pl/a/
lewacki-krucyfiks-nie-to-mnie-nie-obraza,54200.html [access: 8.04.2020].
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the aforementioned accusation of blasphemy leveled at John Paul II.36 Elsewhere, 
for instance, “Fronda” asks: “The Pope invited the controversial artist to play in 
the Vatican. Is it blasphemy?”.37 P. Lisiecki holds the view that the display of Pa-
chamama figures in the Vatican approved by Pope Francis is a blasphemy.38 There 
is however no information on reporting the crime of insult to religious feelings 
committed by priests or ministers of other religions who criticize their own religion 
or make heretical theses, even if the Episcopate openly evaluates the behavior of 
some priests as such.39 This means that the practice of applying the law restricts the 
category of the subject to those perceived as attacking a given religious denomi-
nation. “True” members of a given denomination do not offend religious feelings 
regardless of the words they utter.
Acknowledging the delicate and complex problem of drawing the boundaries 
between the protection of freedom of conscience and religion and freedom of ex-
pression, A. Wąsek postulated de lege lata that the provision of Article 196 of the 
Criminal Code be interpreted restrictively and with great caution. In his opinion, it 
is to be achieved by a proper interpretation of the normative elements of the term 
“profane”, as well as by using the formal and material description of the crimi-
nal offence specified in Article 1 § 2 of the Criminal Code,40 pursuant to which, 
a prohibited act of negligible social harmfulness does not constitute a crime. I am 
convinced that the restrictive interpretation proposed by the author is not sufficient 
to maintain the necessary balance between freedom of religion and freedom of 
expression. The question thus arises whether a balance between these values is 
the real issue at stake.
The law applicable to the issue under consideration may be summarized by 
the diagnosis prepared by G. Jędrejek and T. Szymański in the form of a 10-point 
statement containing their view on the reasons for deficiencies in the way the 
36 One of Christian movements – Sedevacantism – points to several other instances of blasphemy 
committed by John Paul II. Cf. John Paul II and the Inverted Cross, www.blessedquietness.com/
journal/housechu/inverted.htm [access: 8.04.2020]; John Paul II’s miscellaneous apostasy, blasphemy, 
and sacrilege, 9.11.2005, www.mostholyfamilymonastery.com/catholicchurch/john-paul-ii-photos-
sacrilege/#.VbFVYdLtmko [access: 8.04.2020].
37 Papież zaprosił kontrowersyjną artystkę, aby zagrała w Watykanie. To bluźnierstwo?, 
19.11.2014, www.fronda.pl/a/papiez-zaprosil-kontrowersyjna-artystke-aby-zagrala-w-waty-
kanie-to-bluznierstwo,44148.html [access: 8.04.2020].
38 Paweł Lisicki: Pachamama w Watykanie to bluźnierstwo, 9.11.2019, www.dorzeczy.pl/nasi-w-
mediach/119899/pawel-lisicki-pachamama-w-watykanie-to-bluznierstwo.html [access: 8.04.2020].
39 The Episcopate spokesman declared that the celebration of the mass before Pride Parade by 
Priest S. Niemiec “satisfies the elements of blasphemy”. See A. Szczęśniak, „Jako ksiądz jestem 
antyklerykałem” – mówi Szymon Niemiec. To on odprawił nabożeństwo przed Paradą, 9.06.2019, 
https://oko.press/jako-ksiadz-jestem-antyklerykalem-mowi-szymon-niemiec-to-on-odprawil-nabo-
zenstwo-przez-parada [access: 8.04.2020].
40 A. Wąsek, Ochrona uczuć religijnych…, p. 225.





protection of religious feelings is currently regulated. They claim that the gap be-
tween applicable law and its application is due to: 1) the view that the protection 
of religious feelings, in particular under criminal law, leads to censorship; 2) the 
treatment of religious feelings as an interest protected by law, but being in fact 
“secondary” to other interests; 3) losing sight of the basic principle of the conti-
nental law system stating that where there is a subjective right, it must be possible 
to protect that right in all cases under procedural law; 4) the fear that a person 
defending religious feelings might be accused of “obscurantism”, ignorance, etc.; 
5) limited knowledge of applicable legal instruments that allow the protection of 
religious feelings; 6) the treatment of freedom of expression as an absolute inter-
est subject to no restrictions; 7) passivity of secular Catholics; 8) habits of many 
judicial staff members formed in a previous era, as before 1989, the protection of 
religious feelings was often of a fictitious nature; 9) the placing of emphasis on the 
objective element in civil law protection; 10) the lack of “respect for applicable 
law” dating back to the times of the Polish People’s Republic.41
INSULT TO RELIGIOUS FEELINGS AND BLASPHEMY
The offence against religious feelings is commonly known, albeit somewhat 
incorrectly, as “blasphemy”. As E. Dąbrowska and I.C. Kamiński argue, the concept 
of blasphemy was not much needed for a long time, as the concept of heresy was 
used instead. Only Protestants who were seen by the Catholic Church as “here-
tics” needed a new structure, but they also thought of blasphemy as equivalent to 
a “false” religious doctrine. In the Middle Ages, the promotion of atheism was 
also considered blasphemy.42 Nonetheless, numerous modern opinions stress that 
blasphemy is to be used solely to denote insult against God.43
The literature review shows that over time both Poland and other countries in-
creasingly moved from the theological understanding of blasphemy.44 The last time 
classic blasphemy was explicitly provided for under Polish law was in the Criminal 
Code of 1932.45 As noted by W. Wasil, the crime of blasphemy against God came to 
41 G. Jędrejek, T. Szymański, op. cit., pp. 201–202.
42 E. Dąbrowska, I.C. Kamiński, Przestępstwo bluźnierstwa religijnego w angielskim common 
law, “Problemy Współczesnego Prawa Międzynarodowego, Europejskiego i Porównawczego” 2009, 
vol. 7, p. 6.
43 Cf. A. Draguła, op. cit., pp. 9–10; W. Wasil, Od bluźnierstwa do przestępstwa, czyli co tak 
naprawdę chroni państwo: Boga czy uczucia religijne? Studium historyczno-prawne, “Kościół i Pra-
wo” 2019, vol. 8(1), pp. 203–218.
44 W. Wasil, op. cit., p. 206.
45 Article 172 had the following wording: “Whoever insults God in public shall be liable to 
a penalty of deprivation of liberty for a term of up to 5 years”.
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be defined in criminal codes as an insult to the religious worship of the community 
or as a religious insult against believers, and thus the codes of European countries 
changed the subject matter of protection from God to the rights of the community 
of believers who are citizens of a given country.46 We cannot ignore the view that 
although the current Criminal Code does not penalize blasphemy against God, such 
acts are penalized by the structure of protection of religious feelings. Assuming 
that apart from material items, objects of religious worship include also God and 
saints within the meaning of religious doctrines,47 then it follows that the scope of 
the offence against religious feelings covers onetime blasphemy too. G. Jędrejek 
and T. Szymański share the view stating that “it could hardly be accepted that the 
legislator criminalizes insult against objects while at the same time allows for the 
insult against the subjects of worship, which is evidently more painful for believ-
ers. Argumentum a minori ad maius is justified in this case”.48 This stance is not 
isolated. Similar views (indicated above) are expressed by W. Wróbel,49 S. Hypś50 
and the Constitutional Tribunal.51
Account should also be taken in this regard of the distinction (or lack there-
of) between the concepts of “blasphemy” and “heresy”. History has shown that 
these concepts have not always been or are properly distinguished. For instance, 
Calvin relentlessly called for the fight against blasphemous heretics comprising in 
essence, according to his teachings, all those who had different religious views.52 
Moreover, the 17th century is known for hunting blasphemers. During that period, 
there were many reformation movements in Europe that denied the main truths of 
faith, so their teachings were treated as heretical blasphemy.53 It would seem that 
even today persons calling for penalization do not necessarily distinguish “insult 
to religious feelings” from “heresy”54 or even from “criticism”.55 Viewed in that 
46 W. Wasil, op. cit., p. 207.
47 M. Mikuła, Granice dozwolonego dyskursu antyreligijnego w II Rzeczypospolitej. Uwagi do 
orzeczenia Sądu Najwyższego z 5 lipca 1938 r. i jego aktualność dzisiaj, “Studia z Prawa Wyznanio-
wego” 2010, vol. 13, p. 180.
48 G. Jędrejek, T. Szymański, op. cit., pp. 182–183.
49 W. Wróbel, op. cit., pp. 659–660.
50 S. Hypś, op. cit., p. 977.
51 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 6 October 2015, SK 54/13, Journal of Laws 2015, 
item 1632.
52 A. Draguła, op. cit., p. 175.
53 W. Wasil, op. cit., p. 205.
54 As given on the website of the Catholic Piotr Skarga Association, utterances such as “God 
does not exist” or denying the divine justice are forms of blasphemy. See M. Kostka, Problemy. Nie 
bluźnij!, www.piotrskarga.pl/nie-bluznij-,11133,12420,p.html [access: 8.04.2020].
55 Cf. the assessment of an observation made by L. Jażdżewski in P. Jóźwik, Krytyka Kościoła 
czy obrażanie, www.przewodnik-katolicki.pl/Archiwum/2019/Przewodnik-Katolicki-19-2019/Wi-
ara-i-Kosciol/Krytyka-Kosciola-czy-obrazanie [access: 8.04.2020].





way, the words of L. Igwe are disturbingly true, “Every believer is a blasphemer 
because the teaching of one religion rejects the doctrines of other denominations. 
What in fact one religion recognizes as sacred another considers profanation. Is-
lamic religious doctrines mock Christian faith and vice versa. Both Christian and 
Islamic preachers mock the claims of indigenous African religions when they teach 
their own faith. Religions are by definition mutually blasphemous”.56
DE LEGE FERENDA DEMANDS
An analysis of de lege ferenda demands will make it possible to adequately 
demonstrate how to interpret the provision of Article 196 of the Criminal Code, as 
well as to highlight the social needs of at least some social groups.
One example of the proposed amendments is the new wording of the provision 
proposed by A. Wąsek. The provision would then bear the following wording: “Who-
ever publicly insults the beliefs of another person in the area of faith, in particular faith 
in God, or publicly insults an object directly related to religious worship or a place 
dedicated to the celebration of religious rites, if this act could violate social order, 
shall be liable to a fine, a penalty of limitation of liberty, or a penalty of deprivation of 
liberty for a term up to 2 years”.57 In a similar vein, J. Kędzierski calls for amendments 
to Article 196 of the Criminal Code proposing that it should read as follows: “§ 1. 
Whoever publicly insults God shall be liable to a penalty of deprivation of liberty for 
a term of up to 5 years. § 2. Whoever publicly reviles or derides a legally recognized 
denomination or religious association, its dogmas, beliefs or rites, as well as an object 
of religious worship or places dedicated to the celebration of religious rites shall be 
liable to a penalty of deprivation of liberty for a term of up to 3 years. § 3. Whoever 
maliciously interrupts a public, collective celebration of a religious act of a legally 
recognized denomination or religious association shall be liable to a fine, a penalty of 
limitation of liberty or a penalty of deprivation of liberty for a term of up to 2 years”. 
The scholar holds the view that there is no protection of freedom of conscience and 
religion without the criminal law protection of God, religious denominations, their 
dogmas and acts.58 Moreover, well-known Catholic publicist K. Kratiuk is convinced 
that blasphemy should be penalized for the sake of the perpetrators themselves. As 
he claims: “After all, a person punished for offending God has a greater chance of 
conversion and atonement than the one whose crime goes unpunished”. Then he adds: 
56 L. Igwe, Ściganie bluźnierstwa zasługuje na szyderstwo i pogardę, 27.04.2017, www.listyzna-
szegosadu.pl/nowy-ateizm-i-krytyka-religii/sciganie-bluznierstwa-zasluguje-na-szyderstwo-i-pogarde 
[access: 8.04.2020].
57 A. Wąsek, Przestępstwa przeciwko przekonaniom religijnym…, p. 38.
58 J. Kędzierski, Przestępstwa przeciwko religiom i wyznaniom w polskim prawie karnym – de 
lege ferenda, “Palestra” 2007, no. 7–8, p. 82.
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“Over the years, our faith has become increasingly shallow and driven by emotions – 
hence the existence in the Criminal Code of a provision concerning insult to religious 
feelings. This wording implies that we believe in the existence of religion, but not 
in the existence of God. The point is that even atheists and other lefties know that 
religion exists (and so do feelings)”.59
Voices have also been raised calling for a change in the procedure for prose-
cuting the offences against religious feelings from public prosecution to private 
prosecution.60 It would seem that such a proposal makes sense, in particular in 
comparison with other offences subject to private prosecution (as long as the gen-
uine aim is to protect feelings and freedom, but not public order). However, the 
specificity of the crime and the particular activity of persons who claim that their 
religious feelings are being offended mean that a change in the mode of prosecution 
will have a limited impact on the use and perception of the said crime.
The crux of the matter – in the light of the issue of the ratio legis of the provi-
sion of Article 196 of the Criminal Code raised in the title of this article – clearly 
lies in the calls for the decriminalization of the offence against religious feelings. 
It, therefore, seems necessary to compare the arguments put forward in favor of 
the provision in question with the arguments for its repeal.
There is no doubt that the most important argument invoked to retain the offence 
against religious feelings in the Polish legal order is the constitutionally guaranteed 
religious freedom of every individual. The importance and relevance of this form of 
freedom is indicated above. However, for the sake of underlining the importance of 
this prerequisite for criminalization, it is useful to quote the view expressed in the 
literature that “the freedom of conscience and religion, which safeguards the auton-
omy of the individual, protects the very core of their dignity”.61 Given that criminal 
law is assigned a role in the protection of socially significant values, the criminal 
law response to violations of religious freedom is part of the State’s ius puniendi. It 
is worthy of note that the recognition of religious freedom imposes on the State an 
obligation not only to refrain from violating it, but also to protect it against violations 
by other people.62 The merits of this view are further confirmed by the European 
Court of Human Rights rulings that “as a matter of principle it may be considered 
necessary in certain democratic societies to sanction or even prevent improper attacks 
on objects of religious veneration, provided always that any ‘formality’, ‘condition’, 
59 K. Kratiuk, op. cit.
60 Cf. W. Brzozowski, Bezstronność światopoglądowa władz publicznych w Konstytucji RP, 
Warszawa 2011, pp. 112–113.
61 W. Janyga, Przestępstwo obrazy uczuć religijnych…, p. 87.
62 Cf. W. Odrowąż-Sypniewski, O zgodności z Konstytucją postulatu wykreślenia z polskiego 
prawodawstwa przepisów o „przestrzeganiu wartości chrześcijańskich” i „obrażaniu uczuć religij-
nych”, “Zeszyty Prawnicze Biura Analiz Sejmowych” 2006, no. 3, p. 22.





‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ imposed be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”.63 
The argument has therefore been advanced that the elimination of criminal law protec-
tion of religious feelings would run counter to Article 53 of the Polish Constitution.64
Reference should be made in this respect to the aforementioned view expressed 
by A. Zoll that “the possible abolition of provisions penalizing the offence against 
religious feelings is equivalent to giving the go-ahead for intolerance, which can 
in turn lead to far-reaching social tensions”.65 This view relies on a completely 
different argument – decriminalization of the behavior under analysis may lead to 
social unrest, the prevention of which also falls under the responsibility of the State.
The objections to the criminalization of the offence against religious feelings 
are more varied, but it is attributable, at least in part, to the fact that their proponents 
seek to change the status quo. The most official form thus far was a parliamentary 
draft of 2012 amending the Criminal Code by repealing Article 196 of the Criminal 
Code.66 As indicated in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft, its 
aim was “to provide freedom of expression of opinion and belief in public without 
fear of being accused of offending religious feelings”.
The literature review and the public debate conducted mainly through the mass 
media show that the following objections are raised to support the derogation of 
Article 196 of the Criminal Code.
First, serious doubts arise over the interpretation of the provision, which does 
not go unnoticed even by the supporters of criminalization of the offence against 
religious feelings.67 The summary analysis of the contents of the provision made 
above shows how hard it is to set the limits of criminalization of the behavior de-
fined in that provision. One of the scholars in fact admits that “there is generally 
no common agreement as to the interpretation of any of the statutory elements of 
the offence against religious feelings”.68 The question thus arises whether there was 
an infringement of the principle of the specificity of a criminal provision derived 
from the contents of Article 42 of the Polish Constitution. What such lack of pre-
cision in the formulation of statutory elements means for judicial practice is shown 
63 Judgement of the ECHR of 20 September 1994, Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, application 
no. 13470/87, as cited in M.A. Nowicki, Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka, vol. 2, Warszawa 
2002, pp. 1059–1060.
64 W. Odrowąż-Sypniewski, op. cit., p. 23. In a sense, also R. Paprzycki, Prawna ochrona…, p. 46.
65 D. Jaworski, M. Müller, Kodeks Boga nie chroni, “Tygodnik Powszechny” 2010, no. 3, p. 6.
66 Poselski projekt o zmianie ustawy – Kodeks karny, Sejm RP, VII kadencja, Druk nr 2677, 
Warszawa, 8 lipca 2014 r., http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki7ka.nsf/0/6993DFE7DEB35C0C-
C1257D410036BBBB/$File/2677.pdf [access: 8.04.2020].
67 Cf. L. Ozdarska, Przestępstwo obrazy uczuć religijnych w polskim kodeksie karnym, “Studia 
Prawnoustrojowe” 2013, no. 19, pp. 123–135.
68 J. Strzelecki, Kryminalizacja obrazy uczuć religijnych, [in:] Nauki penalne wobec szybkich 
przemian socjokulturowych. Księga jubileuszowa Profesora Mariana Filara, eds. A. Damski, J. Bo-
jarski, P. Chrzczanowicz, M. Leciak, vol. 1, Toruń 2012, p. 476.
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by high-profile cases in which court decisions arouse major controversies. A case 
in point is notification on suspicion of committing a crime of insulting St. John 
Paul II by the former President of Słupsk, R. Biedroń, in connection with removal 
by Biedroń of a photo of the Pope from his office, which in the opinion of the per-
sons reporting the crime was an offence under Article 196 of the Criminal Code.69
As W. Cieślak notes, what constitutes an object of religious worship of one 
faith (religion) can be perceived as a blasphemy by followers of another.70 And such 
situations will surely take place also in Poland given the increasingly widespread 
multiculturalism.
The axiological objections, also referring to the provisions of the Polish Con-
stitution, are of an even more serious nature.
First, an infringement of the principle of proportionality must be identified 
(Article 32 (3) of the Polish Constitution) in the context of a proportional response 
to an act. A criminal penalty is fundamentally the most painful response; moreover, 
the status of a person convicted of an intentional crime entails many negative legal 
and social consequences. Such consequences of a conviction appear to be a grossly 
disproportionate response to an insult to someone’s religious feelings. It is not 
simply a matter of penalty and its consequences. Questions are raised whether that 
criminalization is useful, necessary and adequate.71
Another objection concerns the unjustified protection afforded to the feelings 
of believers, without comparable protection of the feelings and beliefs of non-be-
lievers.72 Assuming, as indicated by M. Brzeska, that the feelings related to the 
atheistic worldview can be protected by other provisions of the Criminal Code 
(e.g., Articles 257, 212 and 216),73 the same regulations may equally well be used 
in the context of the protection of religious feelings following a potential repeal of 
the provision of Article 196 of the Criminal Code.
The issue of the lack of sufficient justification for the criminal law protection of 
religious feelings is also raised in the context of no protection of feelings in all other 
areas (feelings for another person, aesthetic or philosophical feelings). “There is no 
reason why St. Paul should be treated by the law of a democratic state differently from 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. However, this is not the case. Saying, for instance, 
that St. Paul was a third-rate political writer of antiquity, and his ‘Epistle to the Ro-
69 R. Nowak, Prezydent Słupska znieważył św. Jana Pawła II, 23.06.2015, www.fronda.pl/a/prezy-
dent-slupska-zniewazyl-sw-jana-pawla-ii,53112.html [access: 8.04.2020]. The author argues that St. John 
Paul II is legally a subject of religious worship and is protected by Article 196 of the Criminal Code.
70 W. Cieślak, „Pasja” przed sądem, [in:] Fascynujące ścieżki filozofii prawa, ed. J. Zajadło, 
Warszawa 2008, pp. 107–108.
71 Cf. primarily J. Kulesza, Kryminalizacja obrazy uczuć religijnych. Glosa do wyroku TK z dnia 
6 października 2015 r., SK 54/13, “Państwo i Prawo” 2016, no. 9.
72 Cf. the parliamentary Draft amending the Criminal Code indicated above.
73 M. Brzeska, op. cit., p. 115.





mans’ is testimony to his intellectual shallowness, not to mention the public burning 
of a book in which the ‘Epistle’ was printed, may mean that you end up in court”.74
A very serious objection is also based on the opinion that the provision serves 
to eliminate artistic phenomena not approved by specific social groups. It may be 
aptly illustrated by the above-mentioned case of D. Nieznalska and her installation 
titled Passion. The case of Nieznalska and her final acquittal did not send a clear and 
unequivocal signal to the public. Many artistic endeavors are still being subjected 
to criminal law evaluation.75
Other objections are made by J. Hartman, an ethicist and philosopher, who holds 
the view that Article 196 of the Criminal Code “represents a concession to the times 
when the State had its religion and protected it by law punishing for blasphemy. 
This concession was made by zealous authorities at the request of the Church, or 
perhaps in an attempt to curry favor with it, using the hands of a Catholic codifier, 
most likely a professor of law, to guarantee that mighty institution the strongest 
protection against more radical criticism”.76
R. Paprzycki considers that the issue must be raised of whether the Criminal 
Code should provide for offences against freedom of conscience and religion at all. 
In his opinion, criminal law should stigmatize “only really dangerous behavior”. 
He goes on to conclude that the reason for the criminalization of acts detrimental 
to the freedom of conscience and religion is “probably, above all, the great impor-
tance of religion in the social life of Poles and the position of the largest churches 
and religious associations”. The author has concerns that the penalties may prove 
to be “a tool for enforcing moral principles, the violation of which does not have 
significantly harmful consequences for society”.77
Further, J. Strzelecki points to a contradiction with the broadly understood 
principles of rational criminalization.78 On the one hand, the determination of the 
subject matter of protection may still be a problem (and this primarily justifies 
criminalization). On the other hand, the principle of subsidiarity of criminal law 
74 J. Majmurek, Drażliwość religijna i demokracja, 3.09.2013, www.krytykapolityczna.pl/
artykuly/opinie/20130903/majmurek-drazliwosc-religijna-i-demokracja [access: 8.04.2020].
75 The Nationwide Committee for the Defence against Sects and Violence filed a notification 
on suspicion of blasphemy allegedly committed by artist Albert Załuski of Nowy Sącz, who hung in 
the windows of his apartment crucified figures with crossbar codes above their heads (in the shape 
of a globe) and with bottles in their hands. See A. Oskierko, Komitet Obrony przed Sektami: ta praca 
to bluźnierstwo!, 4.12.2013, www.gazetakrakowska.pl/artykul/1057844,komitet-obrony-przed-sek-
tami-ta-praca-to-bluznierstwo,id,t.html?cookie=1 [access: 8.04.2020].
76 J. Hartman, Co łączy Polskę i Izrael? Kara za obrazę uczuć, 31.07.2012, www.polityka.pl/ty-
godnikpolityka/kraj/1529157,1,co-laczy-polske-i-izrael-kara-za-obraze-uczuc.read [access: 8.04.2020].
77 R. Paprzycki, Graj szatanie. Prawnokarna ochrona sumienia i wyznania a działalność sata-
nistów, “Rzeczpospolita” 2000, no. 221, p. C-3.
78 J. Strzelecki, op. cit., p. 476 ff.
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has been breached given the fact that the measures provided for in civil law or in 
the Code of Petty Offences seem sufficient.79
Finally, the fact that there is no need for criminal law protection of religious 
feelings may stem (as given above) from the existence of other criminal law pro-
visions that protect interests that are more precisely defined and in principle do 
not raise interpretative and axiological doubts (e.g., offence of defamation, insult, 
destruction of property).
To summarize this part of the analysis, it should be pointed out that in the 
Recommendation 1805 (2007) of the Council of Europe with regard to blasphe-
my, religious insults and hate speech against persons on grounds of their religion 
adopted on 29 June 2007, it was stated that in multicultural societies it is often 
necessary to reconcile freedom of expression and freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion. It may also be necessary to place restrictions on these freedoms, any 
such restrictions must be prescribed by law, necessary in a democratic society and 
proportionate to the aims pursued. In the opinion of the Assembly, blasphemy as 
an insult to a religion, should not be deemed a criminal offence.80 In contrast, the 
Commission decision issued 10 years earlier stated that “members of a religious 
community must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs 
and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith. Also, the 
right to freedom from interference with the rights guaranteed in Article 9 (1) of 
the Convention does not necessarily and in all circumstances imply a right to bring 
any specific form of proceedings against those who, by authorship or publication, 
offend the sensitivities of an individual or a group of individuals”.81
SUBJECT MATTER OF PROTECTION IN THE PAST 
AND IN THE PRESENT
The subject matter of protection is the most important statutory element of 
each type of prohibited act, as it often constitutes the ratio legis of all provisions 
criminalizing specific behavior. It is worth emphasizing that the subject matter of 
protection of the crime under consideration is in fact a justification for the restric-
tion of freedom of expression and it is therefore a significant element of the entire 
analysis. In the case of the crime of insult to religious feelings, the determination 
79 Ibidem, p. 487. Cf. M. Wąsek-Wiaderek, Cywilnoprawna ochrona wolności sumienia i uczuć 
religijnych, [in:] Prawo wyznaniowe…, pp. 227–228.
80 Assembly debate of 29 June 2007. Text adopted by the Assembly on 29 June 2007. See 
Rada Europy przeciwko tzw. obrazie uczuć religijnych, transl. M. Twardowski, www.racjonalista.pl/
kk.php/s,6055#_f1 [access: 8.04.2020].
81 Commission Decision of 18 April 1997, Dubowska and Skup v. Poland, applications no. 
33490/96, 34055/96.





of a generic and specific subject matter of protection leads to disputes and raises 
doubts in the doctrine. It would be worthwhile mentioning some of them.
At the outset, seeking the grounds for the criminalization of religious crimes, 
one cannot ignore somewhat exotic remarks which are in fact a good example of 
the bygone sacral rationalization. Priest M. Kostka (Priestly Fraternity of Saint 
Peter) makes the following comments on the website of the Piotr Skarga Asso-
ciation: “Perhaps someone will ask: why did the State look into the matter of 
the sin that should remain a personal matter between God and the blasphemer? 
The reason is that blasphemy has always been considered a kind of social vice. 
Where a certain number of individuals adhere to something like this, it becomes 
a kind of public sin that brings God’s harsh punishment on the whole country 
where such insults are thrown at God with impunity. For God cannot be mocked 
(Galatians 6:7)”.82
E. Kruczoń takes the view that there is no de lege lata justification in J. Woj-
ciechowska’s argument that Article 196 of the Criminal Code protects the idea of 
freedom of beliefs of citizens in matters of faith, which stems from the consti-
tutional principle of freedom of conscience and religion and is an expression of 
ideological tolerance of the State that maintains neutrality in matters of religion 
and beliefs. In the opinion of E. Kruczoń, J. Wojciechowska erroneously equates 
feelings with beliefs which, in addition to the emotional element typical of feel-
ings, also contain an intellectual element.83 The view that the religious feelings of 
believers, that is a psychological phenomenon, are the subject matter of protection 
is relatively common in the world of criminal law science.84 In contrast, W. Wróbel 
argues that the subject matter of protection is the right to the protection of religious 
feelings.85 Along the same lines, the Supreme Court stated in its resolution that the 
subject matter of protection to which the crime under Article 196 of the Criminal 
Code relates is the right to protect religious feelings that stems from freedom of 
conscience and religion.86
Nonetheless, opposing views are also put forward here and there. Even 
representatives of communities of deeply religious believers are not prepared 
82 M. Kostka, op. cit.
83 E. Kruczoń, Przestępstwo obrazy uczuć religijnych, “Prokuratura i Prawo” 2011, no. 2, p. 39 
and the literature cited therein: B. Kunicka-Michalska, J. Wojciechowska, Przestępstwa przeciwko 
wolności, wolności sumienia i wyznania, wolności seksualnej i obyczajności oraz czci i nietykalności 
cielesnej. Rozdziały XXIII, XXIV, XXV i XXVII Kodeksu karnego. Komentarz, Warszawa 2001, p. 730.
84 As, e.g., J. Bafia, K. Mioduski, M. Siewierski, Kodeks karny. Komentarz, Warszawa 1987, 
p. 208; O. Górniok, [in:] Kodeks karny. Komentarz, ed. A. Wąsek, Gdańsk 2003, p. 989; A. Marek, 
Prawo karne, Warszawa 2003, p. 528.
85 W. Wróbel, op. cit., p. 500.
86 Resolution of the Supreme Court of 29 October 2012, I KZP 12/12, OSNKW 2012, no. 11, 
item 112.
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to agree to an interpretation of the provision that would emphasize religious 
feelings87 and call for its amendment towards a prohibition on offending religious 
symbols.88
The differently defined subject matter of protection of classification under 
Article 196 of the Criminal Code is the freedom of conscience and religion – as 
indicated by the title of the 24th chapter of the Criminal Code that includes that 
provision. The question now arises as to the aspect of that freedom. W. Janyga is 
of the opinion that Article 196 of the Criminal Code protects religious freedom 
in its internal and external aspect in the intellectual, emotional and volitional 
dimensions and protects religiosity as a phenomenon; it involves freedom from 
profane behavior in relation to objects and places connected with religious wor-
ship.89 M. Filar argues that the direct subject matter of protection is the freedom 
of particular individuals from any behavior consisting of an insult to their reli-
gious feelings which generates a sense of mental discomfort associated with the 
perceived lack of respect for their religion.90 Further, an important distinction is 
made by M. Derlatka who observes that God is the object of religious worship, 
and the subject matter of the protection under Article 196 of the Criminal Code 
is only the right to protection of religious feelings.91 S. Dziwisz rightly notes that 
criminal law, as is the case with other areas of law, does not protect religiosity as 
a phenomenon.92 Ultimately, however, it is right to share the pessimistic conclu-
sion by J. Strzelecki that the clarifications on what constitutes the subject matter 
of protection of the provision under consideration are merely apparent and as 
such cannot be deemed sufficient to justify criminalization, which only gives the 
appearance of rationality.93
At the same time, there are still views referring to the aforementioned concept 
derived from the Criminal Code of 1932 – the protection of public order. As noted 
by J. Wojciechowska, the aforementioned view of J. Makarewicz that the main idea 
behind so-called religious offences is to prevent social disruption remains valid.94 
On a similar note, A. Zoll warns “the possible abolition of provisions penalizing 
87 Cf. a comment by T. Terlikowski in connection with the performance of a play „Golgotha 
Picnic” in Kontrowersje wokół „Golgota Picnic”. Stawia pytanie fundamentalne: czy chrześcijanie 
sprostali chrześcijaństwu?, 6.07.2014, www.tvp.info/15944933/informacje/polska/kontrowersje
-wokol-golgota-picnic-stawia-pytanie-fundamentalne-czy-chrzescijanie-sprostali-chrzescijanstwu 
[access: 8.04.2020].
88 T.P. Terlikowski, Zakazać profanacji, a nie obrazy uczuć, 18.08.2011, www.fronda.pl/a/
terlikowski-zakazac-profanacji-a-nie-obrazy-uczuc,13989.html [access: 8.04.2020].
89 W. Janyga, Przestępstwo obrazy uczuć religijnych…, p. 181 ff.
90 M. Filar, op. cit., p. 591.
91 M. Derlatka, Bóg nie potrzebuje ochrony, “Rzeczpospolita”, 3.07.2012.
92 S. Dziwisz, op. cit., p. 124.
93 J. Strzelecki, op. cit., p. 483.
94 J. Wojciechowska, [in:] B. Kunicka-Michalska, J. Wojciechowska, op. cit., p. 72.





the offence against religious feelings is equivalent to giving the go-ahead for in-
tolerance, which can in turn lead to far-reaching social tensions”.95
It appears that the European Court of Human Rights eventually takes a similar 
position on the issue. Even the ultra-Catholic Polish organization Ordo Iuris ap-
pears to share the view when it posts the following on its website: the provisions 
protecting religious feelings not only do not conflict with the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, but judging by the 2018 case of 
E.S. v. Austria held before the ECHR, it is the responsibility of domestic authorities 
to ensure the peaceful coexistence of different denominations and religions, which 
is pursued by such provisions.96 It follows from the European Court of Human 
Rights judgement that there is a danger that gratuitously offensive expressions 
going beyond the limits of a critical denial of other people’s religious beliefs are 
likely to incite religious intolerance.97 A similar assessment was given earlier by 
the Constitutional Tribunal: “In the opinion of the Constitutional Tribunal, the 
restriction of the freedom to express offensive or profane opinions referred to in 
Article 196 of the Criminal Code clearly complies with the requirement of statutory 
regulation and is in addition necessary in a democratic state, above all, to protect 
the rights and freedoms of other persons, as well as the public order, i.e. the values 
referred to in Article 31 (3) of the Polish Constitution”.98
J. Kulesza expressed a critical assessment of that position. He stated: “It is 
not possible to accept the consideration of the Constitutional Tribunal that the 
interest protected by Article 196 of the Criminal Code includes not only religious 
feelings, but also public order. In this way, it seems to unknowingly refer to the 
concepts appearing in the jurisprudence of the ECHR that also relate to the pro-
tection of public order. This view cannot be accepted given that there is no basis 
for indicating public order as the subject matter of protection of Article 196 of the 
Criminal Code. The subject matter of protection is construed by decoding the scope 
of criminalization by means of analysis of a set of statutory elements of a generic 
type of the crime and a systemic interpretation that refers directly to the social 
undesirability of an act as decisive for criminalization and forming the background 
of the social harmfulness of a particular act. The analysis of Article 196 of the 
Criminal Code does not allow for the identification of public order even as the 
secondary subject matter of protection. Moreover, such indication would in fact be 
95 As in D. Jaworski, M. Müller, op. cit., p. 6.
96 Ochrona uczuć religijnych w wybranych państwach Europy. Analiza prawnoporównawcza 
z uwzględnieniem orzecznictwa Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka, https://ordoiuris.pl/wol-
nosc-sumienia/ochrona-uczuc-religijnych-w-wybranych-panstwach-europy-analiza-prawnoporow-
nawcza-z [access: 4.04.2020].
97 Judgement of the ECHR of 25 October 2018, ES v. Austria, application no. 38450/12.
98 Ibidem.
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pointless in the light of the fact that public order is, in essence, the subject matter 
of protection of any generic type, which is why such acts constitute crimes in the 
first place”.99 
CONCLUSIONS
The reflections on the subject matter of protection completing the conducted 
analyses provide a good opportunity to attempt to formulate final conclusions.
The first question to be considered is why the legislator added religious feelings 
to the list of feelings protected by criminal law while omitting others, undoubtedly 
important in human life. Such feelings naturally include: pride in one’s own scien-
tific and artistic work, the insult of which does not constitute a crime; attachment to 
non-religious ideas such as humanism, science, atheism; attachment to non-religious 
authorities. Even marital infidelity is not criminalized, although it oftentimes hurts 
human feelings very deeply and is a life tragedy for many people leading some of 
them to commit suicide. Finally, the feelings of football fans (and not only foot-
ball) are not protected even though they have demonstrated the intensity of their 
emotions on numerous occasions.
It may appear that the constitutional obligation of the State to protect the free-
dom of conscience and religion is the answer to the above question. However, I am 
not sure whether the views of many lawyers and the judicature on the relationship 
between the above freedoms and the protection of religious feelings is as indisput-
able, and almost dogmatic, as it is given in the literature. The constitutions and many 
international acts guarantee various aspects of freedom. Treaties and constitutions 
protect family, science and freedom of artistic expression. The Polish Constitution 
in Article 68 (5) declares that “public authorities shall support the development of 
physical culture”. The obligations to protect the relevant feelings cannot however 
be deduced from such declarations. Further, the Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief indi-
cated above, which, in the opinion of J. Sobczak, aims at confirming the relation-
ship between religious feelings and the freedom of conscience and religion, does 
not address the protection of religious feelings. It refers to tolerance and religious 
freedom, which is not the same.100 In other words, the constitutional provisions do 
not require the criminal law protection of religious feelings.
It seems quite legitimate to wonder whether Article 196 of the Criminal Code 
relates merely to the matter of religious feelings. In other words, are the said reli-
99 J. Kulesza, Kryminalizacja obrazy uczuć religijnych…, p. 139.
100 Deklaracja w sprawie eliminacji wszelkich form nietolerancji i dyskryminacji opartych na 
religii lub przekonaniach, http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/onz/1981.html [access: 8.04.2020].





gious feelings, despite being verba legis, the primary justification for criminaliza-
tion? These doubts can be illustrated through a question posed by W. Cieślak, who 
wonders whether we are prepared to gag people in the name of the preservation 
of public order (and to avoid a particular provocative “axiological dialogue”).101
All the aforementioned doubts arising from the lack of a precise description of the 
prohibited behavior and, most of all, the admissibility of criminalization of blasphemy 
in the 21st century in a European country show that the protection applies in fact to 
public peace, and not to religious feelings. This argument may be confirmed by the fact 
that criminal law protection does not apply to other feelings that are equally important in 
human life, even though they are guaranteed by the Polish Constitution. Moreover, the 
significance of social order in the light of Article 196 of the Criminal Code is also indi-
cated by a kind of impunity for behavior harmful to religious feelings, but committed by 
members of a given denomination. In such situation, there is no danger that believers of 
a given denomination will protest publicly against their “teacher”. This means that the 
protection of public peace that may be disturbed by hurt believers became the premise 
for the criminalization of the behavior defined in the provision of Article 196 of the 
Criminal Code. The limited comments given above, in particular by the criminal law 
specialists from the interwar period, confirm this argument. The question is whether 
religious feelings, and more precisely, an insult to religious feelings, may give rise to 
negative behavior. Examples may be provided by history and, in the present day, by 
the attacks in response to the outrage of religious feelings associated with Islam. Can 
the Polish legislator be afraid of such unrest? Yes. The ongoing social, ideological and 
religious changes that make Polish society lose its almost religiously homogeneous 
nature are conducive to more violent reactions. The contemporary events, protests and 
marches confirm that attitudes (towards various issues) are becoming increasingly 
more radical. It, therefore, seems legitimate to claim that the criminalization of the 
insult to religious feelings is a form of penalization in the foreground of violation of 
the goods such as law and social order (understood as peace or harmony). And this is 
the reason why only those feelings are subject to criminal law protection.
These questions also raise another concern – whether the offence against reli-
gious feelings is inserted in an appropriate chapter. The question could arise as to 
whether the insertion of that provision among the crimes against freedom of con-
science and religion is of a fictitious nature and is perhaps even an indication of the 
legislature’s obscurantism. Its generic subject matter of protection is public order, 
and at the same time it constitutes its prerequisite for criminalization. It should be 
recalled that in this case public order is to be understood in the strict sense as order 
and peace on the streets, or as being free from riots and aggressive demonstrations.
So I do not agree with the opinion of W. Wasil cited above that the statutes of 
European countries changed the subject matter of protection from God to the rights 
101 W. Cieślak, op. cit., pp. 108–109.
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of the community of believers who are citizens of a given state.102 On the one hand, 
penalization for blasphemy may be based in Poland on the current legal state. But 
most of all, it is the fear of riots caused by hurt believers of any religion that forces 
legislators to prohibit insults to religious feelings. Let us recall an excerpt from the 
Supreme Court ruling of 1925: “Religious believers are particularly aware of any 
offences against their religious feelings, any attacks on the freedom of worship 
and religious interests can cause unrest and riots, therefore the State, in the name 
of social order and public peace, is forced to afford its criminal law protection to 
religion”.103 Hence the tolerance for behavior that could objectively be perceived as 
an insult to religious feelings, but since it is displayed by a member of a religious 
community, there is no fear that it will give rise to unrest or disruptions.
This is a case of simplified criminalization defined by L. Gardocki as the appli-
cation of criminal law standard by substitution to behavior other than the one that is 
difficult to prove and remains hidden behind the criminalized behavior, or to specific 
behavior in order to prevent others that involve higher social undesirability.104 It is 
forbidden to offend religious feelings in order to prevent more serious social unrest. 
This model of criminalization also explains the discrepancy between the individual 
subject matter of protection (which is religious feelings) and the prerequisite for 
criminalization (which is peace and social harmony).
The question arises whether criminalization is justified for such reasons. J. Ku-
lesza claims that “the degree of social undesirability of the assessed behavior should 
constitute the limit of simplified criminalization. It is unacceptable to criminalize 
behavior that has a link to other behavior involving higher social undesirability, 
but that link with a potential breach or jeopardy of an interest appears to be too 
remote”.105 It should be emphasized that in the case of penalization of the insult 
to religious feelings, the behavior of some persons is subject to penalties in order 
to prevent dangerous behavior of others. Is it appropriate to protect those feelings 
rather than merely stigmatize disproportionate reactions triggered by an injury to 
such feelings? After all, there are no provisions prohibiting insult to feelings of 
football fans through the profanation of the symbols of football teams. Instead, the 
prohibition and response relate (at least in principle) to inadequate reactions of fans 
hurt in their love for club colors. The Polish legislature should take a similar position 
in this case. This is all the more so, we reiterate the point, because a decision on 
criminalization is not a matter of the importance of the feelings or the importance 
of their object or subject.
102 W. Wasil, op. cit., p. 207.
103 Ruling of the Supreme Court, Collection of Rulings of the Supreme Court, Penal Chamber 
1921, no. 146.
104 L. Gardocki, Zagadnienia teorii kryminalizacji, Warszawa 1990, p. 66.
105 J. Kulesza, Zarys teorii kryminalizacji, “Prokuratura i Prawo” 2014, no. 11–12, p. 106.
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ABSTRAKT
Niniejszy artykuł dotyczy kryminalizacji naruszania uczuć religijnych i ma charakter naukowo-
-badawczy. Problemem naukowym jest ustalenie rzeczywistego ratio legis czynu opisanego w art. 196 
Kodeksu karnego, co pozwoli ocenić, czy decyzja kryminalizacyjna jest słuszna. Autorka nie podziela 
powszechnie prezentowanych poglądów o przedmiocie ochrony i uzasadnieniu karalności obrazy 
uczuć religijnych. Porównanie przestępstw, które przewidują karalność za naruszenie innych uczuć, 
a także bezkarne naruszanie odczuć innej natury pozwala na sformułowanie tezy, że w przypadku 
art. 196 Kodeksu karnego to nie uczucia religijne i ich ochrona stały się przyczyną decyzji krymina-
lizacyjnej. Za taką przyczynę należy uznać obawę przed społecznymi konsekwencjami naruszania 
uczuć religijnych. Ponieważ zachowanie to kryminalizowane jest w większości państw na świecie, 
znaczenie niniejszych ustaleń naukowych ma międzynarodowe znaczenie, zarówno teoretyczne, jak 
i praktyczne.
Słowa kluczowe: naruszanie uczuć religijnych; bluźnierstwo; kryminalizacja; ochrona; Kodeks 
karny
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